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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
A STUDY ON  
THE IMPACT OF U.S. “STRATEGIC FLEXIBILITY”  
ON THE KOREA-U.S. ALLIANCE 
 
 
By 
 
KIM, Jung Hyok 
 
 
Last several years, the USFK‘s relocation and its transformation have been hot issues 
in Korea. The USFK has stationed roughly for 60 years right after the Korean War to 
defend South Korea from the invasion of North Korea and Communists. The alliance 
has unprecedentedly grown the most successful one in the world. The alliance 
relations have developed into strong solidarity through the Korean War and the Cold 
War era. 
 
However, since President Bush took his office, the world security environment has 
dramatically changed. Even worse, uncertainty of security environment has been 
spread out since the Iraq War and the Afghanistan War. The 9/11 tragedy catalyzed the 
declaration of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), furthermore, the U.S. needed to 
ii 
 
have new strategies to protect the U.S. from potential enemies. As a part of the 
security strategy, the military transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review 
(GPR) have been launched to get strategic flexibility to cope with new challenges of 
irregular and disruptive threats. The core concept of the military transformation is to 
take superiority through the technology and mobility of equipment, and the core 
concept of the GPR is to get strategic flexibility through relocation or readjustment of 
the troops abroad in order to deploy its forces to disputes area. These kinds of 
concepts will be applied to the USFK with no exception. 
 
In this paper, I take a look at the background of the military transformation and the 
GPR as well as the U.S. strategies for security environment against the new threats of 
the 21
st
 century. Moreover, this paper analyzes implications of the USFK‘s expansion 
of strategic flexibility for the security of the Korean peninsula and the ROK-US 
alliance, which were led by the changes of the U.S. strategy. Through above analyses, 
this paper suggests the directions for improving the ROK-US alliance relations. 
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I. Introduction 
 
The Republic of Korea (ROK) and the United States (U.S.) have had a strong alliance 
since the Korean War in 1950. The ROK-US alliance is one of the greatest role 
models of alliance during the half past century. The U.S. has been the most reliable 
‗blood-alliance‘ for Korea, which has kept security and liberal democracy against 
communist countries such as North Korea and Soviet Union during the Cold War era. 
However, the ROK-US alliance, one of the strongest alliances in the world, faces the 
needs of adjustment because of the rapidly and fiercely changing security 
circumstances in the 21
st
 century. Especially, right after 9/11 tragedy, the security 
circumstances of the U.S. has dramatically changed, which affected on the ROK-US 
alliance. The 9/11 catalyzed the U.S.‘s global policy fundamentally.  
 
Right after President Bush took his office, he recognized the changes of world wide 
security environment. Moreover, after the 9/11 in 2001, he declared the Global War on 
Terrorism (GWOT), which meant the changes of the U.S. National Security Strategy 
as well as National Military Strategy. The U.S. executed military transformation and 
Global Defense Posture Review (GPR), which gave the U.S. strategic flexibility and 
allowed preparing against various threats including irregular warfare, terrorism, and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The main concept of military transformation 
and the GPR is to make all troops over the world seize military strategic flexibility.  
 
After the end of the Cold War, the threat of conventional warfare had dramatically 
weakened. Nevertheless, the U.S. was still preparing conventional warfare just like 
World War II or Vietnam War using Tanks, Cannons, and other conventional weapons.  
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The 21
st
 century‘s security environment is being diverted to irregular warfare, terror, 
regional conflict, and cyber war which need quick reactions to deal with. It means that 
these new threats of security environment require rapid, agile, and decisive response. 
The U.S. has to make its military forces swifter, lighter, and more deployable to 
manage these new threats. Thus, it calls for the change of missions and roles of the 
U.S. forces oversea and the military transformation. As mentioned above, the threat of 
conventional warfare has faded out in the post Cold War era, so, the meaning of 
regional station forces is also insignificant. The U.S. announced the plan of base 
realignment and closure of forces abroad including the USFK. Aforementioned, the 
USFK should adopt the GPR which has been conducted by the U.S. government to 
have strategic flexibility. 
 
The realignment or relocation of the USFK will be completed in late 2008. Most of 
U.S troops will be relocated under the line of Han River which might cause the 
decrease of the U.S.‘s tripwire effect at the border of two Koreas. The meaning of 
relocation/realignment may be the change in the USFK‘s missions or the decrease the 
number of U.S. soldiers in Korea, if so; both are serious problem to the Korean 
peninsula. Moreover, the USFK‘s relocation and readjustment on its mission without 
building a consensus with Korea may damage not only the relationship between ROK 
and US which is half century-long unbroken alliance, but also the Northeast Asia 
security environment. Therefore, the necessity of establishing a new ROK-US alliance 
system in accordance with the change of the global security environment has been on 
the rise. The command structure is now changing. And the security environment is 
fluctuating over the Korean peninsula. We can expect new command structure after 
the dissolution of the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and the war time Operation 
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Control (OPCON) transfer from the U.S. to Korea in 2012.  
 
Even though the threats from North Korea have been decreased notably for last 
several years, North Korea still remains as one of the main threats to Korea. 
Consequently, the ROK needs to protect itself together with its strong alliance, the 
U.S., against the North Korea‘s invasion. This means that the ROK-US alliance still 
needs to consolidate national security and defense readiness. In that sense, for the 
purpose of enhancing the ROK and U.S. alliance, two things should be resolved in 
advance: first, the ROK-US alliance should be redefined according to the new 
security circumstances and threats of the 21
st
 century and the U.S.‘s new 
national/military strategies; second, the mission and role of the USFK should clarify 
the direction of changes and transformation.  
 
In this study, I will analyze impacts of the relocation of the USFK on the Korean 
peninsula and the ROK-US alliance according to the U.S. strategic transformation. I 
will suggest the most appropriate way to maintain the boosted ROK-US alliance. In 
order to maintain the coherence, this study will assume three main conditions as 
follows: first, North Korea will not collapse but be weakened; second, as the nuclear 
issue is now settled down, the threats of war will be decreased in some degree; third, 
the ROK-US alliance is still important to the Korean peninsula to keep peace and 
stability, moreover, the USFK is also important to secure peace in Northeast Asia as a 
stabilizer.  
 
Due to the limitation to access the core information of the defense system, this study 
is based on existing publications, previous studies, and open resources to the public 
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such as internet website, newspapers, and so on. I referred not only to the official 
views of both the Korean and the U.S. governments such as White Paper, QDR, and 
the U.S. policy reports to the Congress, but also the views of the civilian activist 
groups, NGOs, and scholars who protest the U.S.‘s expansion policy like military 
hegemony in order to maintain a balanced perspective.  
 
This thesis consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the main theme of the thesis. 
Hence, it covers the purpose and assumption. Chapter 2 will explore the background 
of the U.S. military transformation and the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) in 
aspects of changing global security environment, responding to various threats in the 
21
st
 century and acquiring strategic flexibility. Chapter 3 will present the meaning of 
strategic flexibility and the methods to achieve it. It will also examine the USFK‘s 
strategic flexibility and concerns about the changes of the USFK. Chapter 4 will 
analyze the impacts of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility in the aspect of the ROK-US 
alliance. Chapter 5 will suggest the directions for a future ROK-US alliance based on 
the analysis in chapter 4. Finally, chapter 6 will review overall of this thesis and give 
recommendations for the future ROK-US alliance.  
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II. Background of the U.S. Military Transformation and the Global 
Defense Posture Review (GPR) 
 
A. Overview of the U.S. Military Transformation 
1. Background of the Military Transformation 
The Bush Administration identified transformation as a major goal for the Department 
of Defense (DOD) soon after taking office, and has justified many of its initiatives for 
DOD in connection with the concept. Defense transformation can be defined as large-
scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive changes in military weapons, concepts of 
operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), and organization.  The issue is how 
Congress will take the concept of defense transformation into account in assessing 
and acting on Administration proposals for DOD.
1
  
 
When Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, returned to the Pentagon after 
a 25-yaer hiatus, he recognized that the department was still organized to fight the 
Cold War, which had ended a decade earlier. The military services were structured in 
virtually the same manner, though at considerably lower levels, as they had been for 
decades. Key weapons systems, though modernized, were essentially those of the 
Vietnam War-bombers, fighters, tanks, aircrafts and the like.
2
 With respect to 
planning, the Pentagon still anticipated the need to fight two major contingencies, just 
as it had in World War II. War plans were inflexible, and were altered through a 
process that was more cumbersome than meaningful.
3
 
                                                         
1
 Ronald O‘Rourke, Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, Defense Transformation: 
Background and Oversight Issues for Congress. (Updated November 9, 2006) Visit this website: 
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL32238.pdf (Access Date: 16 May 2008) 
2
 Dov S. Zakheim, ―U.S. Military Transformation and the Lessons for South Korea on its Path toward 
Defense Reform 2020,‖ Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. Vol. XIX, No. 4, Winter 2007, p.6. 
3
 Ibid., p.6. 
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Defense Secretary Rumsfeld had launched military transformation, which he did not 
coin the term ―transformation‖, but he certainly popularized it. It was Army Chief of 
Staff, GEN. Eric Shinseki, who had in the late 1990s announced a program he termed 
―transformation.‖4 GEN. Shinseki hoped to set a new direction for a post-Cold War 
Army that had found itself engaged in peacekeeping and peace enforcement in the 
Balkans even as it continued to maintain, and attempted to modernize, its heavy 
forces. Shinseki‘s efforts nevertheless had borne few fruits in the year before 
Rumsfeld took office. After Rumsfeld was sworn into the office, he initiated a series 
of studies that addressed all of the areas he wished to transform. Finally, this has been 
called the ―Rumsfeld Doctrine.‖5 
 
The United States required transformation in changing the form, or structure of U.S. 
military forces. These were the nature of military culture and doctrine supporting 
those forces; and streamlining its war-fighting functions to more effectively meet the 
complexities of the new threats challenging the U.S. in the new century. Preparing for 
the future will require the U.S. military to think differently and develop the kinds of 
forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new challenges and unexpected 
circumstance.
6
 U.S. military doctrines have been conducting similar operations with 
                                                         
4
 He came into office in June 1999 with a clear vision for "transformation" and talked passionately 
about the army's need to adjust from thinking about traditional enemies to what he called 
"complicators", including both terrorists and the then little-known phrase "weapons of mass 
destruction". Gen Shinseki might thus have relished the arrival of a Republican team equally 
committed to change. Visit this website: http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/mar/29/iraq.usa 
(Access date: July 20, 2008) 
5
 The Rumsfeld Doctrine (named after Donald Rumsfeld) is a journalist created neologism concerned 
with the perceived transformation of the United States Military. It would be considered Rumsfeld's own 
take on RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs). It seeks to increase force readiness and decrease the 
amount of supply required to maintain forces, by reducing the number in a theater. This is done mainly 
by using LAVs (Light Armored Vehicles) to scout for enemies who are then destroyed via airstrikes. 
The basic tenets of this military strategy are: 1. High technology combat systems, 2. Reliance on air 
forces, 3. Small, nimble ground forces  
Afghanistan and the Iraq wars are considered the two closest implementations of this doctrine. Visit 
this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rumsfeld_Doctrine (Access Date: July 24, 2008) 
6
 Linda D. Kosaryn, ―High-Tech Weapons, Resourceful Troops Will Keep Army Strong‖ American 
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those of World War II and Desert Storm in 1990s. With the end of the Cold War, and 
with fewer conventional threats facing the U.S., the challenges of fighting new 
enemies demands new way of thinking. In particular, after the Iraqi War, traditional 
alliance has transformed into the ‗Coalition of the willing.‘7 Rumsfeld stated that any 
kind of advanced weapons cannot transform U.S. forces without the transformation of 
the way of thinking, training and fighting.
8
  
 
2. Purpose of the Military Transformation 
The purpose of the military transformation which the U.S. intended could be 
summarized as minimizing the possibility of damage by counter attack of the enemy, 
materializing Network Centric Warfare (NCW)
9
 and Effect Based Concept (EBC). 
These carry out war through information network under the dispersion to attack 
enemy dimensionally, and developing and distributing Effect Based Capabilities as a 
combination dimension. The US is developing Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) 
which is simultaneous and asymmetric military operations. This meant that 
reorganization of a military structure such as strengthening the Navy and the Air 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Forces Press Service, Feb 14, 2002. Visit this website: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43936 (Access Date: 24 July 2008) 
7
 Han, Seok Pyo, ―The US military transformation and its implication on the ROK-US Alliance: 
focusing on strategic flexibility,‖ Seoul National University M.A Thesis, 2006, P.19 and footnote 21. 
8
 Williamson Murray, ―Military Culture Dose Matter‖ Strategic Review, Vol.27, No. 2, Spring 1999, pp 
30-40: Thomas G. Mahnken, ―War and culture in the Information Age,‖ Strategic Review, Vol. 28, No. 
1, Winter 2000. Pp. 40-45.  
Donald Rumsfeld, ―Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on ‗21st Century Transformation of US Armed Forces,‖ 
31 Jan. 2002. Visit this website: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183 
(Access Date: 10 July 2008) 
9
 Network-centric warfare (NCW), now commonly called network-centric operations (NCO), is a new 
military doctrine or theory of war pioneered by the United States Department of Defense. It seeks to 
translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive 
warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. 
This networking combined with changes in technology, organization, processes, and people—may 
allow new forms of organizational behavior. Specifically, the theory contains the following four tenets 
in its hypotheses: 1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing; 2. Information sharing 
enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 3. Shared situational awareness 
enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; 
and 4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. 
Visit this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare (Access Date: 10 July 2008) 
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Force as well as selected specialized ground Army was needed because the concept of 
war which the U.S. thought was changed from conventional operations to rapid 
decisive operations. That was the main reason that Rumsfeld Doctrine was borne, 
which it refers to a military strategy of blitz tactics with lightened, mechanized, 
flexible and rapid military power.
10
 Table 1 shows differences between the 
conventional operations and rapid decisive operations. Nowadays‘ rapid decisive 
operations emphasize on simultaneous operations which need plans and execution at 
the same time. Therefore, the time is critical factor to achieve successful operations. 
In addition, rapid decisive operation focuses on capability, not numbers.  
 
Table 1. Concept of Conventional Operation and Rapid Decisive Operation 
Conventional Operation Rapid Decisive Operation 
Sequential, Progressive Simultaneous, Parallel 
Deploy, Lodge, Build-up, Plan 
Understand, Access, Strike, Sustain, and 
Move while planning 
Linear Distributed 
Attrition-based Effect-based 
Achieve numerical superiority 
Achieve qualitative superiority, attack the 
enemy‘s capabilities 
Symmetrical Asymmetrical 
Terrain-oriented Time-definite orientation 
Force-oriented Coherence-oriented 
Source: Chris Shepherd, Campaign Plan 2001 Status Briefing, U.S. Joint Forces 
Command, 2000.  
 
                                                         
10
 Anthony H. Cordesman, The Iraq War: Strategy, Tactics, and Military Lessons, 2003, pp. 180-182; 
Rowan Scarborough, ―Decisive Force now measured by speed‖ The Washington Times, 7 May 2003. 
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The security environment has been changed rapidly since the end of the Cold War. 
The U.S. faces the transforming of its military structure in order to follow or meet the 
rapidly changing threats in the 21
st
 century all over the world. That is, the Global 
Defense Posture Review, as is known as the GPR. Under the GPR, U.S. military bases, 
troops, and infrastructures throughout the world have to be re-aligned. In this sense, 
the most important concept of the Military Transformation and Global Defense 
Posture Review (GPR) is an ―acquiring strategic flexibility‖ which allows intervening 
in unstable parts of the world using its limited numbers of Armed Forces. In the 
consequence, realigning the ROK-US alliance and relocating the USFK is inevitable 
and Korea should keep in mind what will happen during the U.S. executing the 
Military Transformation and the GPR.  
 
B. Overview of the Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) 
1. Background of the GPR 
The global posture review had its origins in the 2001 Report of the statutory 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  On November 25, 2003, President Bush 
announced that the U.S. would intensify consultations with friends, allies, and 
partners overseas about the GPR. President Bush also mentioned ―we would realign 
the global posture of our forces to better address the new challenges we face and 
would be consulting around the world on this matter.‖ The concept of this GPR means 
not only merely to reduce the number of the troops and soldiers from the oversea and 
to establish state-of-the-art weapon systems, but also to adjust the location, 
characteristic, and size of troops including comprehensive realigning of the 
relationship with alliances and military cooperation system.
11
 
                                                         
11
 Douglas J. Feith, ―Transforming the U.S. Global Defense Posture,‖ Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Visit this website: 
10 
 
 
Right after President Bush announced the concept of the GPR, Secretary Rumsfeld 
suggested the four notions of operating military forces overseas. The first notion is 
that U.S. troops should be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and 
needed. In some cases, the presence and activities of U.S. forces grate on local 
populations and has become an irritant for host governments. A second governing 
concept is that American troops should be located in environments that are hospitable 
to their movements.  Because U.S. soldiers may be called to a variety of locations to 
engage extremists at short notice, we need to be able to deploy them to trouble spots 
quickly.  It makes sense to place a premium on developing more flexible legal and 
support arrangements with its allies and partners.  Third, the U.S. needs to be in 
places that allow its troops to be usable and flexible.  For example, the 1991 Gulf 
War was a stunning victory.  But it took six months of planning and transport to 
summon the U.S.‘s fleets and divisions and position them for battle.  In the future, no 
one can expect to have that kind of time. Finally, the U.S. believes they should take 
advantage of advanced capabilities that allow the U.S. to do more with less. The old 
reliance on presence and mass reflects the last century‘s industrial-age thinking.12  
 
The effects of the GPR were embodied by the remarks of President Bush to the 
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) Convention on the 16
th
 of August 2004. President 
Bush points out that the world has changed a great deal, for decades, America's 
Armed Forces abroad have essentially remained where the wars of the last century 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=590  (Access Date: July 20, 2008) 
 
 
12
 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Senate Armed 
Service Committee, Washington, DC, 23 September 2004, Visit this website, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156 (Access Date: 26 July 2008);  
Cha, Doo Hyun, ―Implications of the U.S.'s GPR for East Asia's security,‖ Current Issues and Policy, 
The Sejong Institute, Vol. 98, (Sep. 2004) pp. 1-3. 
11 
 
ended, in Europe and in Asia. America's current force posture was designed, for 
example, to protect the U.S. and its allies from Soviet aggression where the threat no 
longer exists. He also mentions that the readiness posture of Armed Forces abroad 
must change with it, and so the U.S. can be more effective at projecting the strength 
of spreading freedom and peace. The new plan will help the U.S. fight and win these 
wars of the 21
st
 century. It will strengthen its alliances around the world, while they 
build new partnerships to better preserve the peace. Although the U.S. still have a 
significant presence overseas, under this plan, over the next 10 years, they will 
withdraw about 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel, and about 100,000 family 
members and civilian employees.
13
 
 
The global posture decision process and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
are tightly linked; indeed they depend on each other. They are both key components 
of President Bush‘s transformation agenda, and they both will be critical instruments 
for stability in the lives of service members and their families. Together, they will help 
to provide more predictability in assignments and rotations. The progress made to 
date on global posture enables DOD to provide specific input on overseas changes for 
the BRAC 2005.  That input will allow domestic implications of the global posture 
review with forces and personnel either returning to or moving forward from U.S. 
territory to be accounted for as effectively as possible within the BRAC decision-
making process.
14
 
                                                         
13
 President Bush‘s Remarks to Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Dr. Albert B. Sabin Cincinnati 
Cinergy Center, 16 August 2004, Visit this website: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040816-12.html (Access Date: 27 July 2008); 
Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Senate Armed 
Service Committee, Washington, DC, 23 September 2004, Visit this website, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156 (Access Date: 26 July 2008)  
14
 Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, Testimony as Prepared for Delivery to Senate Armed 
Service Committee, Washington, DC, 23 September 2004, Visit this website, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=156 (Access Date: 26 July 2008) 
12 
 
It seems that the origins of the GPR are from the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA) and the Defense Transformation which were propelled right after the end of 
Cold War. The military concept of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a theory 
about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organizational 
recommendations for change in the United States military and others. Especially it 
tied to modern information, communications, and space technology. The Defense 
Transformation can be defined as large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly disruptive 
changes in military weapons, concepts of operations (i.e., approaches to warfighting), 
and organization.
15
 
 
The U.S. argues that new technologies make the Defense Transformation possible and 
that new threats to the U.S. security make the Defense Transformation necessary. The 
U.S.‘s vision for the Defense Transformation calls for placing increased emphasis in 
the U.S. defense planning on irregular warfare, including terrorism, insurgencies, and 
civil war; potential catastrophic security threats, such as the possession and possible 
use of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists and rogue states; and potential 
disruptive events, such as the emergence of new technologies that could undermine 
the current U.S. military advantages. The U.S.‘s vision for the Defense 
Transformation calls for shifting U.S. military forces toward a greater reliance on 
joint operations, network-centric warfare,
16
 effects-based operations, speed and 
                                                         
15
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Revolution_in_Military_Affairs (Access Date: 16 July2008) 
16
 Network-centric warfare (NCW), now commonly called network-centric operations (NCO), is a new 
military doctrine or theory of war pioneered by the United States Department of Defense. It seeks to 
translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive 
warfighting advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. 
This networking, combined with changes in technology, organization, processes, and people—may 
allow new forms of organizational behavior. Specifically, the theory contains the following four tenets 
in its hypotheses: 1. A robustly networked force improves information sharing; 2. Information sharing 
enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness; 3. Shared situational awareness 
enables collaboration and self-synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command; 
and 4. These, in turn, dramatically increase mission effectiveness. 
13 
 
agility, and precision application of firepower. Transformation could affect the 
defense industrial base by transferring funding from ―legacy‖ systems to 
transformational systems, and from traditional DOD contractors to firms that 
previously have not done much defense work.
17
 The Defense Transformation concept 
is more comprehensive than the RMA, that is, the defense readiness posture of 
conventional warfare (or ‗industrial age force‘) of the Cold War era is shifting to that 
of the 21
st
 century (or ‗information age force‘). Under the concept of the Defense 
Transformation, rapid response to uncertain security environments and rotational 
replacement depending on the mission are very important. The U.S. military should 
be operated strategically by giving importance on capability than number, and 
widening perspective from the regional to the global.
18
 
  
2. Main Issues of the GPR 
1) Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
The Department of Defense Global Posture Review, also known as the Integrated 
Global Presence and Basing Strategy (IGPBS), is intended to reduce United States 
overseas forces over a six-to-eight-year period from the numbers and locations of 
overseas bases (basing ―posture‖) left over from the Cold War era to new locations 
optimized to support current allies and confront new potential threats. Overall, U.S. 
installations overseas would decline from 850 to 550. Roughly 70,000 personnel, 
mostly from the Army, would return to the U.S. The Congressional Budget Office 
projects the potential cost of this relocation effort at $7 billion, but with a potential 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Visit this website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Network-centric_warfare (Access Date: July 10, 2008) 
17
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savings payoff of $1 billion per year if the number of U.S. troops overseas was 
reduced to a minimum number needed to receive and host deployments.
19
 
 
With the end of the Cold War, these basing arrangements need to be updated to ensure 
that U.S. forces are optimally positioned to respond to potential the 21
st
 Century 
military threats. And the U.S. DOD classifies into three types of oversea bases 
according to its mission and function. With its new posture, it will be defined its 
facilities in the following manner: Main Operating Base (MOB), with permanently 
stationed combat forces and robust infrastructure, will be characterized by command 
and control structures, family support facilities, and strengthened force protection 
measures. Examples include: Ramstein Air Base (Germany), Kadena Air Base 
(Okinawa, Japan), and Camp Humphreys (Korea).  Forward Operating Site (FOS) 
will be an expandable ―warm facilities‖ maintained with a limited U.S. military 
support presence and possibly prepositioned equipment. FOSs will support rotational 
rather than permanently stationed forces and be a focus for bilateral and regional 
training. Examples include: the Sembawang port facility in Singapore and Soto Cano 
Air Base in Honduras. Cooperative Security Location (CSL) Cooperative security 
locations will be facilities with little or no permanent U.S. presence. Instead they will 
be maintained with periodic service, contractor, or host-nation support. CSLs will 
provide contingency access and be a focal point for security cooperation activities. A 
current example of a CSL is in Dakar, Senegal, where the Air Force has negotiated 
contingency landing, logistics, and fuel contracting arrangements, and which served 
as a staging area for the 2003 peace support operation in Liberia.
20
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The biggest changes would happen in Europe, where the military would shutter nearly 
200 facilities and draw down roughly 40,000 troops from 105,570 as of June 2005. 
Some of the forces remaining in Europe would periodically deploy from bases in 
Germany for temporary duty to locations in Romania, Bulgaria, or Central Asia. For 
Asia, the plan advocates consolidating bases in South Korea, with a drawdown of 
nearly 12,500 personnel (from a strength of 32,744 troops in June 2005), and move 
headquarters for remaining units out of expensive Seoul real estate to locations further 
south. Adjustments are also envisioned for troop dispositions in Japan, with an interim 
agreement proposing to move 7,000 of the 15,000 Marines currently on Okinawa to 
Guam. Other U.S. forces in Asia could potentially deploy to the Philippines, Malaysia, 
or Singapore for exercises, training, and as-needed forward basing. Reliance on air 
and naval capability would increase in the Pacific given the vast distances in the 
region. The U.S. presence in Africa would likely expand. The U.S. already has 
established Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, 
Senegal, South Africa, and Uganda, where the focus would be on training and 
cooperation.
21
 
 
As we can see, the U.S.‘s Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) seems to increase 
its military response capability against terrorists, WMD holding countries, and 
potential adversaries. In other words, the U.S. seems that they can get some advantage 
throughout this Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC). That is, the GPR will cover 
the next three issues; winning the war on terrorism and preventing proliferation of 
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WMD, enhancing control power at the ‗Arc of Instability‘; mid-long term check 
against China.  
 
On the first hand, while protecting the CONUS the U.S. wants to win the War on 
Terrorism. The attacks of 11 September 2001 demonstrated that its liberties are 
vulnerable. The prospect of future attacks, potentially employing weapons of mass 
destruction, makes it imperative the U.S. acts now to stop terrorists before they can 
attack again. The U.S. continues to root out transnational terrorist networks, sever 
their connections with state sponsors, eliminate their bases of operation, counter 
dangerous proliferation and establish a global antiterrorism environment. This mission 
requires the full integration of all instruments of national power, the cooperation and 
participation of friends and allies. The WMD threat is not limited to a specific region 
or type of conflict. The enemies are evolving and its strategy must be flexible and 
enable proactive measures. These actors will threaten the United States, its allies, and 
partners with the use of WMD. Non-State actors include terrorists, extremists, 
terrorist networks, transnational threats, non-governmental organizations, businesses, 
rogue scientist and technicians, as well as individuals acting independently of any 
organization. Failed States or States in transition that cannot guarantee the security of 
their WMD pose additional challenges.
22
 
 
Secondly, the U.S. classifies countries that are poor or have possibility to be hotbed of 
terror as an ―arc of instability.‖ There exists an ―arc of instability‖ stretching from the 
Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. 
There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to the U.S.‘s 
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interests. Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting 
them from surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned 
space and under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and 
launch attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit 
activities; such coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal 
elements and ideological extremists.
23
 The U.S. seems to reduce military forces from 
large bases such as Germany and Korea, and to relocate them into these areas such as 
Kyrgyzstan, the Philippines, Singapore, East Europe, and so forth to deal with dirty 
small war effectively.
24
 
 
Thirdly, the U.S. considers China as one of countries of the highest possibility of 
potential conflict in the aspect of future strategic interests. In the National Security 
Strategy of the U.S. in 2006, it portrays China as dramatic economic success country, 
but the role as global leader is not matured yet. And also, the U.S. warns that China 
should not continue military expansion in a non-transparent way; expand trade, but 
acting as if they can somehow ―lock up‖ energy supplies around the world or seek to 
direct markets rather than opening them up; and support resource-rich countries 
without regard to the misrule at home or misbehavior abroad of those regimes. The 
U.S. will continue its cooperation with China for successful anti-terrorism and anti-
proliferation, but in mid-long term perspective, the U.S. is realigning its forces around 
China to check against China and respond contingency situation of it. In addition, the 
U.S. military encompasses around China border to obtain the military superiority. In 
west, the U.S. stations 10
th
 Mountain Division with 1,500 personnel of and 30 
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helicopters at the excuse of Afghanistan War. Including military personnel in 
Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan, the number of the U.S. 
military is up to 110,000. In east, it is covered by the USFK, the PACOM and the 
USFJ with more than 80,000 military personnel. In south, the U.S. gets into stride its 
military cooperation with Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thai for ‗anti-
terrorism,‘ which gives pressure to China at the southern part.25 
 
In this regards, the U.S. is establishing strategic belt in Eurasia continent to connect 
with small scale military bases one another by reducing its long term stationed bases 
in the European and Asian countries. 
 
2) Lightness and Swiftness of the U.S. military 
The U.S. has changed its military concept from a tripwire and a fixed force to a 
deployable force, and has been transforming its military by equipping with capability 
to deal with battlefield and rapid mobility rather than just numbers. According to the 
lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan war, modern warfare is not conducted by 
large scale of military but high-tech weapon, fusion operations of air-ground, 
collecting information and analysis, psychological warfare, and Special Operation 
Force are decisive factors to win the war. Therefore, the U.S. is likely to make its 
forces lighter, faster, and stronger.  
 
While the U.S. military drives the extensive Defense Transformation, the U.S. Army 
modularizes its structures to guarantee the ground forces‘ rapid deployment and to 
achieve force interchangeability in units. The modularization of the Army will 
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increase the number of available combat brigades.  Modularization is the Army‘s 
reorganization from three to four combat brigades per division.  More importantly, 
all brigades will be organized similarly to achieve force interchangeability, just like 
―Lego.‖  Reserve Component brigades will modularize as well.  Together, this will 
significantly increase the number of interchangeable forces in the Army‘s rotation 
pool. More available Active brigades reduce dependence on the Reserve Component.  
These changes will facilitate better use of the Reserve Component by increasing both 
predictability and lead-time of call-ups.  In a similar manner, the other Services are 
organized to create a robust pool of interchangeable forces.  The Air Force will 
continue to use its Air Expeditionary Force construct to manage its rotation base.  
The Marines are re-organizing around Expeditionary Strike Groups.  The Navy will 
form Expeditionary Strike Forces to better manage its rotational base.
26
 Creation of a 
deployable joint-capable headquarters and improvement of joint interoperability 
across all Army units; Force design upon which the future network centric 
developments; reduced stress on the force through a more predictable deployment 
cycle: One year deployed and two years at home station for the Active 
Component; One year deployed and four years at home station for the Reserve Force; 
One year deployed and five years at home station for the National Guard Force.
27
  
 
The U.S. Navy and Air Force are also seeking an improvement of ―Jointness‖ and 
―Speed‖ likewise the Army. The U.S. Air Force launches ‗KC-X‘ program and 
‗FALCON‘ program. The KC-X is the name of the United States Air Force program 
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to procure its next-generation aerial refueling tanker aircraft. This aircraft is intended 
to replace some of the older Boeing KC-135 Stratotankers. This contract is for 179 
new tankers and will be worth an estimated the U.S. $40 billion. New aerial refueling 
tankers will fly about 12,500km and with its maximum fuel capacity of 250,000lb, 
which was improved from KC-135‘s 5,550km and 200,000lb. The KC-X program 
will enhance the USAF‘s rapid deployment capability dramatically.  
 
Moreover, the U.S. military is improving the power projection ability of the Navy and 
Air Force to the oversea. The U.S. accounts for its success on Iraq war was the quick 
and safe transportation of combatants to the Gulf, and then it is expanding the 
maritime and the aerial transportation capacity. The Air Force plans to increase the 
number of C-17 cargo plane from 130 to 180. For the Navy equipment, the U.S. has 3 
100ft level catamarans, which can reach 3,600km in 48 hours, that is, twice time 
faster than other cargo ships. The U.S. military thinks of procuring these ships in 
recent year.
28
  
 
3. The U.S.‘s ―strategic flexibility‖ for oversea bases 
As mentioned above, the concept of the BRAC, lightness and swiftness of the U.S. 
military, and the strategic flexibility of oversea bases are not able to be split 
separately. In cases of contingencies or threats or disputes are broken out, the U.S. 
will send any available service which can respond quickly to the problems in those 
areas. However, if the U.S. can deploy its stronger forces than before to the conflict 
areas and can operate with quicker tempo, the military forces that are committed to 
those areas might be whether the nearest U.S. troop, or the one far away from it. If so, 
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the regional forces in oversea bases are turned to the global level network forces. 
These network forces can be used immediately whenever they are needed without 
fixed station in specific area. That is the strategic flexibility.  
The strategic flexibility of oversea bases, however, generates the change of the 
relations with the host nations. In the past, the main purpose of U.S. troops in oversea 
bases was to protect the host nations from other countries‘ invasion. The expansion of 
the U.S.‘s strategic flexibility turns its host nations‘ characteristics to staging points29 
or coaling stations
30
 preparing for disputes. If this happens, the possibility of host 
nation‘s involvement in regional conflicts which are associated with the U.S. will be 
increased against their will. And also, the host nations‘ excuse for spending defense 
cost sharing for its own national security will be weakened. In the mean time, the 
potentiality of the friction between the U.S. and the host nations which have never 
existed before will be arisen.
31
  
 
A key premise behind the U.S. global footprint in the 1990s was that American forces 
helped maintain regional stability. The new posture, deliberately optimized for 
flexible war fighting, will be viewed as supporting a very different and more 
controversial strategy, one based on preemption and armed intervention. As the 
military analyst Andrew Bacevich of Boston University has observed, ―the political 
purpose [of U.S. troops abroad] is [now] not so much to enhance stability, but to use 
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U.S. forces as an instrument of political change.‖ The new posture would also 
represent a different kind of relations with host nations. In the past, U.S. forces were 
based in other countries in order to protect them from invasion or hostile action by 
others. The host and the United States shared the same risks and the same foe. 
Washington's new vision, however, hearkens back to U.S. policies of a century ago, 
when many host states served largely as ―staging points‖ and ―coaling stations‖ for 
operations elsewhere. Although it is still possible to argue that, under the proposed 
changes, the U.S. presence in foreign countries will serve local interests, and that 
fighting terrorism and containing the spread of WMD will increase host nations‘ 
security, the link (at least for many foreign publics) may appear less clear, and this 
could pose problems down the road.
32
 
 
Chapter 2 provided core concept and background of transformation and GPR. And it 
showed why the United Stated needed to implement the military transformation and 
GPR. It was important to follow the mainstream of this thesis. However, more 
important thing is what the U.S. wanted to get from that implementation. In depth 
analysis regarding on this issue will be followed by next chapter.  
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III. The Application of Strategic Flexibility to the USFK 
 
A. The meaning of strategic flexibility 
1. Concept of ―Flexibility‖ on the military strategy 
Military flexibility is more important than ever because nobody can expect 
complicated security environment and battlefield condition of today easily. The 21
st
 
century security environment faces various military and non-military threats; it 
becomes difficult to find the countermeasure against threatening. In this situation, 
military‘s mission and its scope of activity having been broadened from the 
conventional operation to the counter-terror and supporting national catastrophe as 
well as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) such as peace keeping 
operations (PKO). Consequently, under the uncertain and complicated security 
environment, flexible thinking and countermeasures are necessarily needed for the 
military and leaders in order to successfully complete various duties.  
 
In the aspect of strategic theory and military doctrine, flexibility functions as one of 
the War Principles. For example, British military adopts flexibility as one of the ten 
Principles of War.
33
 They emphasize that flexibility is an essential principle to cope 
with unpredictable and changeable conditions as well as in order not to indulge in 
dogma. On the other hand, the U.S. doctrine does not adopt ―Flexibility‖ as one of the 
nine Principles of War
34
; however, it functions same as the Principle of War. In order 
to achieve the military victory and strategic success simultaneously, the nine 
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Principles of War should be adopted harmoniously; in addition, flexibility plays a role 
as binding material for these nine Principles of War, as if it functions like the tenth 
Principle of War.
35
  
 
As discussed earlier, future forms of warfare can take many paths, and much 
uncertainty lies ahead. Flexible responses are often born of flexible planning. Further, 
in tomorrow‘s unfolding environment where asymmetric and other nontraditional 
threats will be more prevalent, open-minded, nonjudgmental and critical thinking 
skills—at all ranks and levels of war—will become the tools to eliminate dangerous 
blind spots and develop effective solutions. That is flexibility. As we go through the 
21
st
 century, the need for flexibility is an indispensable condition for conducting a 
victory for military operations in uncertain security conditions and ambiguous 
battlefield environments.
36
 
 
2. U.S. military strategy in the 21
st
 century and strategic flexibility on the GPR 
The concept of flexibility has close relations to that of ―speed‖ or ―adaptation.‖ It is 
an ―agile and flexible crisis response system‖ which is most needed to the 21st U.S. 
Military. During the Cold War era, military strategy, which had a possibility of nuclear 
war against the Soviet Union in mind, was based on information about the enemy 
which enabled the U.S. Military to establish the military readiness posture in advance 
throughout careful plans and a prudent decision making process. However, many 
irregular threats and disputes in post-Cold War era are very difficult to solve unless 
they are treated in several days. Even though they are solved, generally they take long 
time to be handled. Thus, today‘s U.S. wants to establish flexible response system 
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which can respond quickly to the changing security environments and various 
unpredictable threats in the 21
st
 century. 
 
In order to meet the needs of the time, the U.S. military marks a change in missions 
and capability. The U.S. is going to convert their mission from fixed military which 
have performed around the world during the Cold War era to a ‗Rapid Deployment 
Force‘ or a ‗Regional Force‘, and maintain the strategic flexibility by enhancing the 
mobility of forces and lightening the troops. These efforts are seen at the Global 
Defense Posture Review (GPR) which is conducted by the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the changes of the 21
st
 U.S. military strategy. 
 
1) Various threats and military preparation 
The Joint Chief of Staff (JCF) has defined three major threats which the U.S. is facing 
today as; a wider range of adversaries, a more complex and distributed battlespace, 
technology diffusion and access. Firstly, a wider range of adversaries means 
adversaries‘ capability of threatening the United States, its allies, and its interests 
range from states to nonstate organizations to individuals. There are states with 
traditional military forces and advanced systems, including cruise and ballistic 
missiles, which could seize the control in key regions of the world. A few of these 
states are ‗rogues‘ that violate treaties, secretly pursue and proliferate WMD/E37, 
reject peaceful resolution of disputes and display callous disregard for their citizens. 
Some of these states sponsor terrorists, providing them financial support, sanctuary 
and access to dangerous capabilities. There are non-state actors, including terrorist 
networks, international criminal organizations and illegal armed groups that menace 
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stability and security. 
 
Secondly, a more complex and distributed battlespace means that adversaries threaten 
the United States throughout a complex battlespace, extending from critical regions 
overseas to the homeland and spanning the global commons of international airspace, 
waters, space and cyberspace. There exists an ―arc of instability‖ stretching from the 
Western Hemisphere, through Africa and the Middle East and extending to Asia. 
There are areas in this arc that serve as breeding grounds for threats to our interests. 
Within these areas rogue states provide sanctuary to terrorists, protecting them from 
surveillance and attack. Other adversaries take advantage of ungoverned space and 
under-governed territories from which they prepare plans, train forces and launch 
attacks. These ungoverned areas often coincide with locations of illicit activities; such 
coincidence creates opportunities for hostile coalitions of criminal elements and 
ideological extremists. 
 
Thirdly, technology diffusion and access means that global proliferation of a wide 
range of technology and weaponry will affect the character of future conflict. Dual-
use civilian technologies, especially information technologies, high-resolution 
imagery and global positioning systems are widely available. These relatively low 
cost, commercially available technologies will improve the disruptive and destructive 
capabilities of a wide range of state and non-state actors. Advances in automation and 
information processing will allow some adversaries to locate and attack targets both 
overseas and in the United States. Software tools for network-attack, intrusion and 
disruption are globally available over the Internet, providing almost any interested 
adversary a basic computer network exploitation or attack capability. Access to 
27 
 
advanced weapons systems and innovative delivery systems could fundamentally 
change warfighting and dramatically increase an adversary‘s ability to threaten the 
United States.
38
 
 
The U.S faces a number of dangerous and pervasive threats. Traditional, irregular, 
catastrophic, and disruptive challenges will require the Armed Forces to adjust 
quickly and decisively to change and anticipate emerging threats. Three key aspects of 
the security environment have unique implications for executing this military strategy 
and will drive the development of concepts and capabilities that ensure success in 
future operations.
39
 
 
In the National Defense Strategy defines four matured and emerging challenges. First, 
traditional challenges are posed by states employing recognized military capabilities 
and forces in well-understood forms of military competition and conflict. Second, 
irregular challenges come from those employing ―unconventional‖ methods to 
counter the traditional advantages of stronger opponents. Third, catastrophic 
challenges involve the acquisition, possession, and use of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) or methods producing WMD-like effects. Forth, disruptive 
challenges may come from adversaries who develop and use breakthrough 
technologies to negate the current U.S. advantages in key operational domains. 
40
 
 
The strategy acknowledges that although the U.S. military maintains considerable 
advantages in traditional forms of warfare, this realm is not the only, or even the most 
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likely, one in which adversaries will challenge the United States during the period 
immediately ahead. Enemies are more likely to pose asymmetric threats, including 
irregular, catastrophic and disruptive challenges. Some, such as non-state actors, will 
choose irregular warfare - including terrorism, insurgency or guerrilla warfare - in an 
attempt to its will through protracted conflict. It then describes the refinement of the 
Department‘s force planning construct to better align the shape and size of U.S. forces 
to address these new challenges and to conduct the full range of military operations.
41
  
 
Since these threats are acted complicatedly and complexly, the U.S. needs inevitably 
to modify the concept of traditional threat-oriented combat readiness. The adversaries 
of the U.S. are using various assault methods such as WMD, terror, and missiles. 
Even worse, their entity and behaviors are assessed as uncertain and unpredictable. As 
mentioned above, the military readiness posture should be moved from traditional 
threat-oriented method toward covering overall threats including irregular, 
catastrophic, and disruptive threat. See figure 1 to refer more precisely.  
 
Figure 1. Shifting Military Portfolio of Capability 
 
Note: As the diagram shows, the Department is shifting its portfolio of capabilities to address irregular, 
catastrophic and disruptive challenges while sustaining capabilities to address traditional challenges. 
Source: Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), 2006, p. 19 
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2) The Concept of the Military Strategy 
The U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) establishes four strategic objectives: 
secure the United States from direct attack; secure strategic access and maintain 
global freedom of action; establish security conditions conducive to a favorable 
international order; and strengthen alliances and partnerships to contend with common 
challenges. The National Military Strategy (NMS) establishes three supporting 
military objectives: to protect the United States against external attacks and 
aggression; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against adversaries. These 
are the ends of the strategy and help to assure allies and friends, dissuade adversaries 
and deter aggression and coercion while ensuring the Armed Forces remain ready to 
defeat adversaries should deterrence and dissuasion fail. They serve as benchmarks to 
assess levels of risk and help to define the types and amounts of military capabilities 
required.
42
 
 
Joint operating concepts (JOCs), currently under development, support each objective 
and link specific tasks to programmatic actions as well as guide the development of 
plans and the execution of operations. The current set of JOCs –Homeland Security, 
Stability Operations, Strategic Deterrence and Major Combat Operations – represent 
related actions that support all of the NMS objectives. While some of the JOCs may 
focus on specific elements of the strategy, success requires integrated action and unity 
of effort across each of the concepts. Although military objectives have enduring 
elements, the ways to achieve those goals must evolve through experimentation, 
operational experience, and the development of transformational capabilities.
43
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Under this concept, the National Military Strategy suggests three strategic principles: 
agility, integration, and decisiveness. Agility is the ability to rapidly deploy, employ, 
sustain and redeploy capabilities in geographically separated and environmentally 
diverse regions. As commanders conduct operations they must consider the effects of 
surprise and the possibility that their forces may have to transition from one type or 
phase of an operation to another quickly, or conduct phases simultaneously, regardless 
of location. Decisiveness allows combatant commanders to overwhelm adversaries, 
control situations and achieve definitive outcomes. Achieving decisiveness may not 
require large force deployments but rather employing capabilities in innovative ways. 
Integration focuses on fusing and synchronizing military operations among the 
Services, other government agencies, the commercial sector, non-governmental 
organizations and those of partners abroad to provide focus and unity of effort. 
Strategic agility, integration and decisiveness allow the Armed Forces to move at great 
speed and distance to undertake combat operations quickly in sometimes overlapping 
conflicts. Agility, decisiveness, and integration support simultaneous operations, the 
application of overmatching power
44
 and the fusion of the U.S. military power with 
other instruments of power. These principles stress speed, allowing U.S. commanders 
to exploit an enemy‘s vulnerabilities, rapidly seize the initiative and achieve 
endstates.
45
 These three strategic principles are mainly based on the strategic 
flexibility which emphasizes on its ―speed‖ and ―adaptation.‖ 
 
In the U.S. strategy visualization, it seems that the direction of military strategy is 
moving toward the expansion of strategic flexibility. Until 2005, the U.S. had the war 
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executing strategy, so called, ‗1-4-2-1‘ 46. The NDS directs a force sized to defend the 
homeland, deter forward in and from four regions (Europe, the Middle East, the Asian 
Littoral, and Northeast Asia).), and conduct two, overlapping ―swift defeat‖ 
campaigns. Even when committed to a limited number of lesser contingencies, the 
force must be able to ―win decisively‖ in one of the two campaigns. However, the 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) 2006 modified the ‗1-4-2-1‘ strategy toward as 
‗1-1-1‘ strategy which means that the U.S. Department has refined its Force Planning 
Construct, dividing its activities into three objective areas: Homeland Defense, War 
on Terror / Irregular (Asymmetric) Warfare and Conventional Campaigns. In all cases, 
the Department should increase its capabilities to conduct operations against enemies 
who employ asymmetric approaches. This refined force planning construct for 
wartime describes the relative level of effort the Department should devote to each of 
the three objective areas.
47
 This means that the U.S. seizes strategic flexibility by 
expanding its interests in not only the four interest regions which mentioned above 
but also other regions.  
 
Bush Administration declares the strategy of preemptive attack also seems that they 
want to establish strategic flexibility. The U.S., if necessary, under long-standing 
principles of self defense, defense of key allies and regional partner, it does not rule 
out the use of force before attacks occur, even if uncertainty remains as to the time 
and place of the enemy‘s attack. The QDR mentions that ―When the consequences of 
an attack with WMD are potentially so devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by 
as grave dangers materialize‖. This is the principle and logic of preemption. And also, 
safe, credible, and reliable nuclear forces continue to play a critical role. They are 
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going to strengthen deterrence by developing a New Triad composed of offensive 
strike systems (both nuclear and improved conventional capabilities); active and 
passive defenses, including missile defenses; and a responsive infrastructure, all 
bound together by enhanced command and control, planning, and intelligence 
systems.
48
 In order to conduct the success of the preemptive strategy, the military 
needs to be transformed to move swiftly. That is why the preemptive strategy has deep 
relation with strategic flexibility.  
 
3) Instruments of military strategy 
In order to implement the military objective and the strategy of the U.S., strategic 
flexibility becomes one of important instrumental concepts. The instruments of the 
U.S. military strategy include both military and non-military availability. That is 
defined as ‗Total Force,‘ and composed of its active and reserve military components, 
its civil servants, and its contractors.
49
 Furthermore, the U.S. regards the allies and 
regional partners as one of the key components of Total Force. That is, the U.S. wants 
to strengthen its relations and alliance with allies and regional partners to conduct the 
global security measures.  
 
Today, the U.S. military is transforming itself to execute its military strategy and cope 
with various threats which the U.S. is facing now. The U.S. maintains its ability to 
deter adversaries and defense the trans-national terrorism and improves its ability to 
execute unconventional warfare for long-duration, in order to develop its ability of 
executing conventional warfare as well as to overwhelm the unconventional war and 
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counterterrorism. The QDR proposed to strengthen forces to defeat terrorist networks, 
the Department will increase Special Operations Forces by 15% and increase the 
number of Special Forces Battalions by one-third. The U.S. Special Operations 
Command (U.S. SOCOM) will establish the Marine Corps Special Operations 
Command. The Air Force will establish an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron under 
the U.S. SOCOM. The Navy will support the U.S. SOCOM increase in SEAL Team 
manning and will develop a riverine warfare capability. The Department will also 
expand Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units by 3,700 personnel, a 33% 
increase. Multipurpose Army and Marine Corps ground forces will increase their 
capabilities and capacity to conduct irregular warfare missions.
50
  
 
B. USFK’s Strategic Flexibility 
Strategic flexibility of U.S. troops abroad which is executed in the scope of the U.S. 
Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) applies to the USFK with no exception. The 
U.S. will not give up the USFK‘s strategic flexibility even though Korea denies it. So, 
this is hot military issue between Korea and the U.S. because the mission and the 
scope of activities of the USFK will be readjusted. I will check the significant changes 
in the mission, role and freedom of flow-in-and-out of the USFK because of strategic 
flexibility. 
 
1. Changes in the mission and role of the USFK 
The expansion of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility means that the role of the USFK is 
changing from a defensive posture against North Korea since Cold War era towards a 
‗regional and global force,‘ that is, more flexible, rapidly deployable force to the 
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wider Asia-Pacific region. Specifically, the USFK will become more mobile and 
readily available throughout the world in order to cope with irregular threats of the 
21
st
 century.
51
 South Korea and the U.S. refer to this as "strategic flexibility" for the 
USFK. And the U.S. emphasizes on the USFK‘s mission as not only for conventional 
warfare but also counterterrorism and counter proliferation which is directly related to 
the U.S.‘s National Security Objective.  
According to the Bush Administration‘s strategic flexibility for U.S. forces abroad in 
order to respond security threats of the 21
st
 century, the changes of the USFK‘s 
mission and role is inevitably visualized. Moreover, the U.S. expands the mission of 
the USFK up to responding terrorism and WMD which appeared in the 21
st
 century. 
In order to increase the USFK‘s strategic flexibility, the U.S. is going to enhance the 
missions and roles of Korea and lessen the responsibility of the USFK in the sense of 
defending the Korea. By doing so, the USFK can play a role as a regional stabilizer in 
Northeast Asia, not sticking in the Korean peninsula.  
 
In this regard, the USFK is transferring of some military missions to the ROK military 
pursuant to an agreement between the ROK-US in the 34
th
 SCM, December 2002.   
Of the ten military missions that have been assumed by the USFK, with the exception 
of day and night search and rescue operations, the ROK military has already taken 
over the JSA security mission, the decontamination operation mission in the rear area, 
expediting the burying of mines, the management of the air to surface firing range, 
mission of counter-fire operation headquarters, the control of the main supply route, 
the operation of counter-SOP forces at sea, the control of close air support (CAS), and 
weather forecasting. Day and night search and rescue operations will be transferred by 
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the end of 2008. Although the two nations agreed to review the transfer of additional 
military missions in the 37
th
 SCM (October 2005), the two decided to integrate it into 
the tasks for transition of the OPCON in accordance with the agreement to coordinate 
the military command relationship. 
 
The transfer of the military mission of the USFK is meaningful in terms of the 
improvement of Korea's leading role in its defense as well as the expansion of the 
mission corresponding to the increment of Korea's military capabilities. Taking into 
account Korea's military capabilities on the basis of this backdrop, the two countries 
will move ahead with the transfer of the military mission on a gradual and phased 
basis.
52
 
 
2. Freedom of ―Flow-in and Flow-out‖ 
The other reason why the U.S. considers the importance of the USFK‘s strategic 
flexibility is because the U.S. wants to utilize the USFK to other regions outside of 
the Korean peninsula. If the U.S. thinks that the USFK is the optimized force for 
deploying to the disputing area, the U.S. is likely to dispatch the USFK rapidly to that 
area without Korea‘s intervention. For this, the U.S. demands the freedom of the 
USFK‘s flow-out and flow-in.53 In August 2004, the U.S. converted 3,600 personnel 
from 2 ID to Iraq as a part of strategic flexibility, especially flow-out and in.  
 
However, this issue of flow-out and flow-in is very sensitive to Korea. This means 
Korea can be faced a security vacuum or be involved in the disputes if the USFK is 
dispatched to regions other than the Korean peninsula in order to intervene to regional 
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disputes or Military Operations Other than War (MOOTW). If the U.S. uses the 
Korean peninsula as its ‗staging points‘ or ‗coaling station,‘ Korea has a high 
possibility of being involved in those disputes.  
 
The meaning of ―flow-out‖ is that the USFK is dispatched to other region. We can 
make assume some situations according to the size of flow-out of the USFK; first, 
converting minimum power while remaining most of existing power, second, 
conversely, converting main power, third, and moving out the whole USFK. If the 
U.S. withdraws minimum of power, there is no difference with previous condition to 
deter the aggression of North Korea. However, if the U.S. converts magnitude of 
power from the USFK or whole of the USFK, Korea will face the significant security 
vacuum crisis. And then, if the USFK intervenes in disputes, the Korea‘s possibility 
of involvement might be high because Korea is regarded as mother base of the USFK. 
In this regard, adversaries of the U.S. might consider Korea as their enemy. Likewise, 
flow-out of the USFK power can cause Korea‘s defense power vacuum and bring 
danger of Korea‘s intervention in disputes directly or indirectly. But the possibility of 
the second and third assumption which converts the USFK with magnitude of power 
or as whole is very low. The strategic importance of the USFK bases and Korea for 
the U.S. is growing further as the U.S. containment strategies against China become 
more concrete. As former President Noh said in L.A., ―Korean peninsula is not a 
place which the U.S. can give up easily even if the U.S. is not happy with South 
Korea, because of the peninsula‘s strategic position.‖ 
 
Flow-in means that the U.S. might deploy additional power to the Korean peninsula. 
It can be classified as two situations; firstly, a contingency situation in Korean 
37 
 
peninsula like North Korea‘s invades South Korea, secondly, the U.S. uses Korean 
peninsula as its staging point or coaling station in order to intervene regional disputes 
other than the Korean peninsula or execute MOOTW. The first one is advantage for 
the situation of defending Korea, but the second one might be problematic. In the case 
of the U.S. uses Korea as its lodgment for deployment, it can affect Korea‘s security 
circumstance negatively. For example, Turkey denied the U.S. using its airport when 
the U.S. was preparing the war with Iraq in 2003. Turkey worried the case if they 
provide the U.S. with the military facilities and allow passing their territorial sky, 
there would be resentment from other Islamic countries and possibility of being 
intervened in the war.
54
 Just like Turkey‘s position at that time, if U.S. forces flows in 
to the Korean peninsula for a purpose of using Korea as ‗staging position‘ or ‗coaling 
station,‘ probability of Korea being involved in disputes will increase.  
 
Likewise, if additional U.S. forces flow in the Korean peninsula to manage the crisis 
will consolidate the Korea national security, but the additional forces flow-in for the 
purpose of deploying other conflict areas will cause unintended intervention to 
disputes and make unstable of national security.  
 
3. The USFK‘s lightness and swiftness 
The U.S.‘s military transformation for lightness and swiftness for the subject of U.S. 
troops abroad is adapted to the USFK with no exception. The ROK-US committed to 
reduce the USFK by 12,500 personnel in 3 stages by 2008. If downsizing is 
implemented according to the agreed plan, the size of the USFK troops stationed will 
be reduced to about 25,000 soldiers by the end of 2008 from 37,500 in 2003. And the 
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U.S. commits to an $11 Billion program of enhancements directly contributing 
to the defense of the ROK.
55
 
 
The USFK announced in May 2003 to allocate $ 11 billion for next three years until 
2006 for the investment to modify and reinforce its war potential posture. Such major 
projects as the following are considered to strengthen the USFK Intelligence 
Collection Systems and Sensors, C4ISR (command management communication and 
information sensor function), Network and Targeting Ability, Improved Precision 
Munitions, Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) Missile and the Korean Air and 
Missile Defense (KAMD) Systems, AH-64D Apache Longbows with Laser-guided 
Bombs, "Stryker" light armored vehicle, M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley etc.  And 
moreover, "Bunker Buster" tactical bomb to attack the underground complex of North 
Korea will possibly be considered. Just like above, the USFK reduces its personnel 
but increases the fire, mobility, and precise hitting ability.  
 
4. Relocation of the USFK 
A relocation project for the Yongsan Garrison has been discussed since March 1988, 
not only to meet the national desire for the transfer of foreign troops stationed in the 
center of Seoul but also to provide the conditions for the stable stationing of the 
USFK in conjunction with a balanced development of the land, and the strengthening 
of the ROK-US alliance. The ROK-US agreed to transfer the Yongsan Garrison 
involving UNC/CFC to the Pyeongtaek area with a target date of the end of 2008. 
This relocation project began by concluding the Yongsan garrison transition 
agreement together with the ratification of the National Assembly in December 2004. 
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Due to the time needed to secure the site because of the residents' opposition, 
evaluation of the environmental impact, and additionally the negotiation of cost 
sharing between the ROK and the U.S., the deadline for the transfer will be 
determined on the basis of the ROK-US consultation.  
 
The USFK‘s moving and relocation of camps/bases are conducted through 2 stages.   
In the 1
st
 stage, the USFK will integrate small dispersed bases stationed north of the 
Han River into Camp Casey in Dongducheon and Camp Red Cloud, Camp Stanley in 
Euijeongbu area by 2006, and in the 2
nd
 stage, major bases will be moved to 
Pyungtaek and Gunsan area by 2008. The USFK is scheduled to be redeployed into 
16 bases within 2 regions as shown in figure 2. During this process, more than 50 
million Pyung will be transferred to the ROK. 
 
Figure 2. USFK‘s Relocation in the Korean Peninsula 
Current Status  After Redeployment 
 
 
 
Source: Defense White Paper, 2006, Chapter 4, p.113. 
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The ROK government made a "master plan for the facilities" in 2006, and plans to 
undertake foundation work in 2007, after completing an evaluation of the 
environmental impact; an investigation of the index of cultural assets; measures of 
migration such as support for migration of residents in the area concerned; and the 
establishment of a migration complex
56
 
 
Moreover, the relocation of the USFK to Pyeongtaek will put U.S. troops south of the 
Han River. This means that the USFK‘s mission, role, and range of activity are 
expanded, that is, the USFK is not just fixed at the border between two Koreas, but 
has flexibility of maneuver. This will give the United States time to respond to a 
North Korea‘s attack, which the U.S. will be able to destroy within minutes. With Air 
Force and Naval Forces in Pyeongtaek, the U.S. will be able to achieve their military 
strategic goals by committing USFK troops throughout the Asia-Pacific region, 
including China and North Korea. In other words, one of goals for the USFK‘s 
strategic flexibility, its broader focus as a rapid deployment force in the Asia-Pacific 
Theater, is to constrain China. The U.S. has tightened its control over the Middle East 
Asia, Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia; it has strengthened its ability 
to respond to this outstretched them more easily. By moving to Pyeontaek, the U.S. 
attempts to deter the challenge and potential threat posed by a rising power of China. 
Like above, it is possible to see the U.S.‘s clear intention of the USFK relocation.  
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In this chapter, we explored the meaning of strategic flexibility and the main intention 
of acquiring flexibility in military forces, especially, the USFK. And also examined 
what the USFK‘s flexibility indicated in Northeast Asia. The next chapter will search 
for the implications of the USFK‘s flexibility for the Korean peninsula and the ROK-
US alliance.  
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IV. Implications of the USFK’s Strategic Flexibility for the ROK-US 
Alliance 
 
A. The ROK-US Alliance Sustenance Factor 
As factors to sustain more than 50 years of the ROK-US alliance relationship, there 
are the ROK-US‘s mutual sharing of benefit, identity and institutionalized alliance. As 
the ROK-US have maintained alliance relationship, they have continually shared 
mutual benefit and as they have shared identity of democracy and market economy, 
they have strengthened the solidarity of the ROK-US alliance. Moreover, after the 
conclusion of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT), the ROK and the U.S. 
have consulted on security issue, operated association and committee to strengthen 
combined forces defense system, institutionalized the ROK-US alliance relationship 
as executing regular combined exercises and expanded alliance union for over half 
century to cope with security situation, alliance relationship has been able to be 
sustained.  
 
Here analyzes that how the expansion of strategic flexibility of the USFK affects 
sustenance factor of the ROK-US alliance. First, through the USFK‘s strategic 
flexibility, benefit and loss shared by both and each country will be analyzed as well 
as unbalance of benefit and loss. Second, for the aspect of institutionalized alliance, 
expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility will be analyzed to find out how it will 
affect on current the ROK-US security cooperation system and institutionalized level 
of combined defense system  
 
To make and sustain alliance, allies need to share the mutual benefit. If the shared 
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benefit is unbalanced, forming and sustaining alliance is difficult. In this perspective, 
through the expansion of the USFK's strategic flexibility, shared benefit of security by 
both countries is needed to be verified and it will bring the positive effects if both 
countries can share the benefit mutually. However, if the loss is greater than benefit or 
benefit is unbalanced, it will bring negative effects. 
 
For the common benefit for the ROK and the U.S., firstly, expansion of the USFK's 
operational range and possibility of additional flow-in will sustain the security of 
Northeast Asia. Secondly, while the U.S. wants to expand the strategic flexibility of 
troops abroad to improve anti-terrorism execution ability, the expansion of the 
USFK's strategic flexibility helps to sustain security from terrorist groups for not only 
the U.S. but also the ROK. Thirdly, if the USFK operates the non-proliferation of 
WMD, Korea also can be protected from the threat of WMD. 
 
In terms of the benefit for ROK, first, ROK can have the possibility of additional 
support from U.S. troops beside reinforced power that is currently planned on wartime 
OPCON-5027. If additional U.S. troops are needed to solve the Korean peninsula 
crisis, it will be provided through strategic flexibility. Second, the ROK restored quite 
a few U.S. troop stations and training camps that were given for free. Through the 
restored sites, ROK is able to create additional social wealth. Third, as missions that 
were in charge of the existing USFK are transferred to the ROK, regulation on the 
importation of high tech weapon system is expected to be lifted or mitigated. 
 
On the other hand, the U.S.‘s benefits are as follow. First, owing to mutual agreement 
of relocation and operation of the USFK with Korea, the U.S. can increase the level of 
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completion of Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) that the U.S. globally promotes. 
The U.S. can maintain Korea as a Power Projection Hub (PPH) which was used to be 
a fixed station of U.S. troops. Second, the USFK becomes utilized in not just 
Northeast Asia, but any country in the world when it is needed. Moreover, because 
additional U.S. troops can be committed to Korea under certain conditions, the U.S. 
becomes to be able to operate the USFK extensively to sustain its influence on 
Northeast Asia and all over the world. Third, through swiftness and lightness of the 
USFK and efficient management of the U.S. station, eventually, the U.S. becomes to 
be able to reduce national defense expenditure. Fourth, through strengthening of the 
ROK‘s combat power, sales of weapon system as well as other war supplies to the 
ROK might be increased. That is, during the process of the introduction of weaponry, 
as Korea considers interoperability of the U.S. troop‘s equipment, the probability of 
procurement of the U.S. made weapon system will be increased. 
 
If the expansion of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility is done like above, there will be 
positive effect on the ROK-US alliance seeing that both the ROK and the U.S. 
eventually get benefits and these can be also shared mutually. Because of the 
established the ROK-US alliance, each country can strengthen benefits that were 
enjoyed by both countries or can make new benefits. 
 
However, loss from the USFK‘s strategic flexibility is also expected. As for the loss of 
the ROK, firstly, while possibility of the USFK‘s involvement in disputes other than 
the Korean peninsula is increasing, the ROK‘s possibility of involving in disputes is 
also increased. Second, it might be different by the size and period, but through flow-
out of the USFK, possibility of security vacuum occurrence will be increased 
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compared to the past. Third, while the ROK promotes ‗Koreanize of the ROK 
defense‘, increase in national defense expenditure will be huge burden for the Korean 
government. Fourth, due to expansion of the USFK power and its sphere of activity, it 
might suppress North Korea militarily or irritate China which will affect negatively on 
North-South relations and Sino-Korean relations.  
 
Unlike expected loss of the ROK, loss of the U.S. is estimated insignificant. Through 
the USFK‘s strategic flexibility, loss of the ROK and the U.S. is a little bit unbalanced. 
Generally, benefit of both country is somewhat balanced, but loss of the ROK is much 
greater. Therefore, potentiality for Korea‘s dissatisfaction is bigger than that of the 
U.S. The unbalanced benefit and loss from both countries through expansion of the 
USFK‘s strategic flexibility could negatively affect the ROK-US alliance relationship. 
 
B. Changes in the ROK-US Alliance System 
The ROK and the U.S. have established the combined ROK-US defense system and 
security cooperation system through the Security Meeting Consultative (SMC), the 
Military Council (MC), and the Combined Forces Command (CFC) and have 
developed as one of the strongest alliance in the world. Then, how will the expansion 
of the strategic flexibility of the USFK affect on the ROK-US alliance system? If the 
existing alliance system aggravates, their relationship will exacerbate. In contrast, 
their relationship will be consolidated from strong existing alliance system. 
 
First of all, the most influential changes on institutionalization of the ROK-US 
alliance are disorganization of the CFC and the ROK‘s independent execution of the 
War-time OPCON. I will see how these changes will affect on alliance 
institutionalization.  
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In fact, the USFK‘s strategic flexibility and the War-time OPCON are separated issues. 
Restitution of the right was not the issue that the USFK‘s strategic flexibility and the 
GPR considered. But during the Security Policy Initiative (SPI) conference, which 
was held in September 2005, the ROK suggested the issue to the U.S. and the issue 
became main agenda of SMC, which was in October of the same year. From these 
processes, the issue became full-scale debate. At the 38
th
 SMC (see Appendix 2.), 
which was held in October 2006, both sides agreed on the ROK‘s independent right to 
execute War-time OPCON in someday between 15 October 2009 and 15 March 2012, 
disorganization of the CFC, and establishment of a new parallel command structure. 
The date for OPCON transfer was later finalized to be April 17, 2012 – when the 
ROK‘s Defense Minister, Kim, Jang-Soo, met the U.S. Defense Secretary, Robert 
Gates, in Washington, D.C. on the 23
rd
 February 2007. This means that current the 
CFC based command system will convert to the new parallel command system, in 
which the ROK and the U.S. control their own forces. Also the Alliance Military 
Coordination Center (AMCC) will be installed to support MC and it will match up 
with the ROK and the U.S. for military operation. (See Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3. Changing Command System 
Current ROK-US Combined 
Command System 
 Future ROK-US Joint Defense System 
 
 
 
Source: Ministry of National Defense, website: www.mnd.go.kr  
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From the U.S.‘s perspective, the ROK‘s demanding redemption of the War-time 
OPCON can be a great advantage to the GPR and the strategic flexibility of U.S. 
forces abroad. The ROK‘s execution of the War-time OPCON and disorganization of 
the CFC imply that the U.S. only plays a role as an auxiliary supporter to defending 
the Korean peninsula and more flexible employment of the USFK is possible. From 
this point of view, the ROK‘s execution of War-time OPCON and disorganization of 
the CFC are said to be coherent with increasing in strategic flexibility of the USFK 
and the GPR.  
 
Like above, opinions regarding the USFK‘s strategic flexibility, redemption of the 
ROK‘s War-time OPCON and disorganization of the CFC are varies. The Ministry of 
Defense, Government and some specialists conceive that new command system will 
be able to maintain the ROK-US combined defense like the previous CFC based 
command system. They believe that the U.S. will intervene and dispatch U.S. forces 
due to 25,000 of the USFK forces and 100,000 of U.S. citizens living in Korea. 
According to the U.S. Domestic Law, specifically, ―War Power Act,‖ the U.S. will 
dispatch the reinforcement forces to the Korean peninsula not because of Mutual 
Defense Treaty (MDT).
57
 
 
In contrast, there are views that the ROK‘s independent execution of the War-time 
OPCON and disorganization of the CFC can aggravate the ROK-US combined 
defense system and alliance.
58
 Some people point out that automatic intervention of 
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U.S. forces in case of the ROK‘s crisis may not be guaranteed. Also they point out 
that even if the AMCC is installed, dualistic command system may be inefficient in 
the aspect of unity of command. Then, North Korea may think this as aggravation of 
the ROK-US alliance and incentives to wage war against South Korea. 
 
However, both views are not easy to assert to reach the conclusion; the probability of 
negative effects is considered a little higher than positive effects. Because the 
meaning of the dissolution of the CFC has the possibility which is the destruction of 
the ROK-US joint operational plans or the reduction of joint exercises. The 
destruction of joint operational plans and the reduction of joint exercises have a 
possibility to cause the weakening of the ROK-US combined defense capability. In 
this position, the expansion of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility and the probability of 
weakening of the ROK-US combined defense system are likely to affect on the ROK-
US alliance negatively. 
 
In this chapter 4, we examined the influences on the ROK and US alliance and the 
Korean peninsula. USFK‘s strategic flexibility had both positive effects and negative 
effects at the same time for the Korean peninsula and the ROK-US alliance. In that 
sense, the closer examination on the changes for the ROK-US alliance is needed for 
better relationship between two countries. Next chapter will suggests methods how to 
improve a future ROK-US alliance for constructing better and stronger relationship 
and alliance. Next chapter would be the main part of our discussion.  
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V. Directions of a future ROK-U.S. Alliance 
 
Up to now, this paper has provided the meaning of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility 
and its impacts for the ROK-US alliance. Consequently, it verified that its strategic 
flexibility has both of negative and positive effects on the ROK-US alliance at the 
same time. In order to sustain the improved future ROK-US alliance in the changing 
21
st
 security environment, Korea should accept U.S. strategic flexibility and minimize 
the negative effects. Hence, I would like to suggest the direction of improvement for 
the ROK-US alliance while diminishing the negative effects on the alliance.  
 
A. Maintain the Sustaining the ROK-US Alliance 
At the 38
th
 SMC, which was held in October 2006, both sides agreed on the ROK‘s 
independent right to execute War-time OPCON in someday between 15 October 2009 
and 15 March 2012, disorganization of the CFC, and establishment of a new parallel 
command structure. The date for OPCON transfer was later finalized to be April 17, 
2012 – when the ROK‘s Defense Minister, Kim, Jang-Soo, met the U.S. Defense 
Secretary, Robert Gates, in Washington, D.C. on the 23
rd
 February 2007. 
 
As the great premise of Korea‘s independent War-time OPCON execution and the 
new ROK-US military command structure has been settled, we have to find the way 
to establish the consolidated the ROK-US combined defense system while reducing 
the concerns about current issues on changes. For this, I suggest two methods to 
maintain the ROK-US alliance.  
Firstly, even though both countries haves their own military command structure, so 
called ‗parallel command system‘, new war-time operational plan should have an 
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integrated single-plan like a current plan and achieve feasibility. Like above figure 3, 
the future combined operations will be led by Korea and the U.S. will support Korea. 
As a matter of fact, the unity of operational plan is the first priority and command and 
order system should be inspected before executing real operations. In the view of 
‗unity of command,‘ the potentiality of decreasing efficiency of operations is very 
high; therefore, both countries should take a look at it closely.  
 
Secondly, through the continuing combined exercise, the ROK-US combined combat 
capability should not be weakened. The annual combined exercises such as Ulchi 
Focus Lens (UFL, now the name was changed to Ulchi Freedom Guardian, UFG from 
2008) and Reception Staging Onward-movement & Integration (RSOI, changed to 
Key Resolve, KR) have played key roles in establishing the ROK-US combined 
defense system. Through these exercises, Korea has drawn insufficiency of the 
operations and made up for the weak points as well as tested for the feasibility of the 
operations. Like the preceding, the new combined command system should be 
verified. Both Korea and the U.S. have already trained the combined exercises under 
the assumption of the ROK leading the operations since the UFL in 2006. After UFG 
in 2008, Gen. Lee, Sung Chool, deputy commander of Joint Forces Command (JFC) 
said, ―This exercise was very important phase to convert the wartime OPCON in 
2012,‖ he continued ―we will continuously establish the system of plan, execution, 
and organizational structure by using lessons learned from this UFG in 2008.‖59  
Like above exercise, Korea has to smoothly land to the ground in 2012. 
  
                                                         
59
 Lee, Seok Jong, ―Successful Finish of the First UFG Exercise,‖ The Korea Defense Daily, 25 
August 2008. 
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B. Mutual Agreement on Flow-in and Flow-out  
From now on, Korea acknowledges the strategic flexibility of U.S. forces in Korea; 
however, Korea has to be fully aware of the number of U.S. forces flowing in and out 
of Korea. In detail – first, there has to a mutual agreement regulating the amount of 
U.S. forces flowing in and out of Korea and period which they are allowed to stay in 
Korea. If a lot of U.S. forces flow out of peninsula and those forces are not replaced 
for a long time, it could lead to security vacuum. Also, if this absence of force 
continues, it could lead to side effects such as reduction of U.S. forces in Korea. 
Second, there has to be a mutual agreement related to deploying U.S. forces in Korea 
to place in disputes or military operations. This could lead Korea to be involved in a 
dispute it did not intend to. Third, there has to be a mutual agreement concerning the 
flowing in and out of main forces for the purpose of deterring against North Korea. 
Absence of main forces such as, fighter wings, high-tech information weaponry, 
missiles, and etc could lead to serious military power vacuum.  
 
On December 2004, at the council conference, Christopher R. Hill, the former 
ambassador of the U.S. in Korea said, ―The main purpose of U.S. forces in Korea is to 
defend the peninsula and no U.S. forces will be utilized without the agreement 
between Korea and the United States.‖60  At an interview, Michael Green, the former 
NSC senior advisor, said, ―When rearranging the main forces that could affect the 
national security we will negotiate with Korea in advance. However, we won‘t be 
restraint to the agreement and the U.S. cannot come up with an agreement that 
regulates the U.S.‖ Korea is worried about the flow in and flow out of U.S. forces due 
to the U.S.‘s vague attitude and this implies that Korea could be dragged by the 
                                                         
60
 Christopher R. Hill, The Korean Council for Reconciliation and Cooperation, 25 October  2004, 
Visit this website: http://seoul.usembassy.gov/ambsp_10252004.html  (Access Date: 24 August 2008) 
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United States‘ policy. 
 
C. Establishing Comprehensive Alliance 
Korea‘s view on the ROK-US alliance is changing. Compared to the past, Korea is 
equal or better than North Korea when it comes to conventional forces. Also, Korea‘s 
economy has grown rapidly. We can say that Korea‘s status has also moved up. Thus, 
the ROK-US alliance should not only be a military relationship of suppressing the 
North, but develop into 21
st
 century security alliance as the U.S. pursuits.  
 
To become a comprehensive alliance, Korea and the United States have to strengthen 
its relationship and begin cooperating politics, economics, military and etc. Share the 
basic value which is democracy and the market economy; focus on the leading peace 
–oriented the ROK-U.S. alliance rather than corresponding to the threats. Additionally, 
the relationship between Korea and the United States has to develop into a 
comprehensive alliance by making a common agenda such as traditional military 
threats, new security threats like terrorism, WMD, human rights issue, and etc.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
The expansion of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility means that its mission will not be 
fixed at the Korean peninsula to depend South Korea against North Korea‘s invasion 
but will be expanded to cope with various tasks like rapid deployment forces. Korea 
has a possibility of being engaged in unexpected disputes when the USFK is involved 
in the disputes other than the Korean peninsula. It will cause tremendous changes in 
the ROK-US alliance and Korea‘s security environment. Therefore, this paper has 
attempted to redefine the relationship between the ROK and the U.S., and introduces 
new direction of the ROK-US alliance to deal with the new security circumstances. 
This paper also suggested methods to improve the ROK-US alliances by minimizing 
the negative effects of the USFK‘s strategic flexibility through analyses of the ROK-
US alliance in the 21
st 
century. 
 
Right after the 9/11 tragedy, the U.S. launched the military transformation and the 
Global Defense Posture Review (GPR) because the U.S. wanted to deal with various 
threats of not only conventional warfare, but also terrorism, WMD, and other security 
environmental changes in the 21
st
 century. On this base, the U.S. can get the strategic 
flexibility throughout base realignment and relocation of the forces abroad. 
Consequently, the USFK has to be changed consistent with the U.S. national military 
strategy and also the ROK-US alliance has to be modified in order to meet the 
requirement of both countries. In this regard, this paper suggested the modest way to 
maintain and improve the relationship between the ROK and the U.S. without any 
conflict. 
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At first, chapter 2 provided background of the U.S. military transformation and the 
GPR. It gave concrete concepts of the military transformation and the GPR. The core 
concept of the military transformation could be summarized as follow: first, 
minimizing the possibility of damage by counter attack of enemy; second, network 
centric warfare (NCW) and effect based concept (EBC). On the other hand, the main 
issues of the GPR were the base realignment and closure (BRAC) and the lightness 
and swiftness of the U.S. military. 
 
Chapter 3 could be summarized into two issues. Firstly, it explained what the strategic 
flexibility was and why the strategic flexibility was important and necessary. Namely, 
there would be various threats in the 21
st
 century security circumstances such as a 
wider range of adversaries threatening the U.S. and its allies, a more complex and 
distributed battlespace, and technology diffusion and access which affect the character 
of future conflict. Secondly, due to the USFK‘s strategic flexibility, the ROK-US 
alliance and the USFK‘s mission would be changed inevitably. This kind of changes 
would be the expansion of the USFK‘s mission/role, increasing the freedom of flow-
in and flow-out, and relocation of the USFK. And also these changes could increase 
concerns about the national security vacuum and the possibility of being involved in 
unexpected disputes. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzed the impacts for the USFK and the ROK-US alliance which were 
generated by strategic flexibility. As a result, it defined that the USFK‘s strategic 
flexibility had effects on the ROK-US alliance at the both side of positive and 
negative.  
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Chapter 5 suggested the direction for the improvement of the ROK-US alliance with 
diminishing negative effects. Firstly, establishing the ROK-US combined defense 
system, secondly, establishing prior consultative body for the USFK forces‘ flow-in 
and flow-out, thirdly, establishing the comprehensive ROK-US alliance system.  
 
As we have seen, the main purpose of this thesis has been to explore the missions and 
roles of the USFK and the ROK-US alliance. However, it was difficult to analyze all 
the characteristics of the USFK and the ROK-US alliance due to the certain limitation 
of scope and research. Nevertheless, this paper provides clear view on the changes of 
the USFK and the ROK-US alliance and suggests the way to improve the relationship 
between two honorable nations to meet the various threats in the 21
st
 century. 
However, regards on this subject, further studies on different large scale assessments 
are needed not merely this strategic flexibility of the USFK but more complicated 
issues like the defense cost sharing and the Korea‘s operational capability without the 
USFK. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1. Abstract in Korean 
 
국문초록 
지난 수년간 주한미군의 재배치와 임무의 변화는 국내에서 뜨거욲 논쟁이 
되어왔다. 주한미군은 한국전쟁 이후 한국에 주둔하여 약 60여 년간 한국
과 함께 북한과 공산세력의 침략에 맞서왔으며 세계에서도 유래를 찾아보
기 힘들 정도의 모범적인 동맹관계를 형성해 왔다. 한국전쟁과 냉전시대를 
거치면서 동맹관계는 더욱 굳건한 형태로 발전 되었다. 
 
하지만 부시 정부 출범 이후 세계의 안보정세는 급격히 변화하였고, 이라
크 전쟁과 아프가니스탄 전쟁을 거치면서 안보에 대한 불확실성은 더욱 확
산되었다. 9/11테러를 촉매제로 하여 미국은 테러와의 전쟁을 선포하게 
되었고, 잠재적인 적의 위협으로부터 미국을 보호하기 위하여 새로욲 안보
전략이 필요하게 되었다. 그 안보전략의 일홖으로 국방변혁과 해외 주둔 
미군 재배치 검토(GPR)를 통해 비정규적이고 파괴적인 잠재 위협에 대처
할 수 있는 전략적 유연성을 확보할 수 있게 되었다. 국방개혁의 핵심 개
념은 장비의 첨단화와 기동화를 통한 비교우위를 점하는 것이고, GPR의 
핵심개념은 해외주둔 미군을 핵심거점에 재배치/재편성함으로써 신속하게 
특정 붂쟁지역에 전개할 수 있는 전략적 유연성을 확보하는 것이다. 특히 
이러한 전략적 유연성의 개념은 주한미군에도 예외 없이 적용된다.  
 
본 논문에서는 미군의 군사변혁 및 해외주둔 미군 재배치 검토 (GPR)의 
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배경을 살펴보고, 미군의 새로욲 안보위협에 대처하기 위한 전략을  
붂석하였다. 또한 미군의 전략변화가 주한미군에 미치는 영향과 그에 따른 
주한미군의 변화를 붂석하였으며, 주한미군의 전략적 유연성 확대가 한반
도 안보 및 한미 동맹에 미치는 영향을 붂석하여 발전적인 한미동맹 관계
를 유지할 수 있도록 방향을 제시하였다. 
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Appendix 2. The 38
th
 SCM  
 
The 38
th
 ROK-US SCM Joint Communique 
   October 20, 2006, Washington, D.C. 
 
1. The 38
th
 Republic of Korea-United States Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) 
was held in Washington, D.C. on October 20, 2006. U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald 
H. Rumsfeld and ROK Minister of National Defense Yoon Kwang Ung led their 
respective delegations, which included senior defense and foreign affairs officials. 
Before the SCM, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace 
and the Chairman of the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lee Sang Hee, presided 
over the 28
th
 ROK-U.S. Military Committee Meeting (MCM) on October 18, 2006. 
 
2. Secretary Rumsfeld expressed appreciation for the continued deployment of the 
ROK armed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan and recognized that the ROK armed 
forces are making a critical contribution to both Iraqi and Afghan reconstruction, 
helping the respective governments to build a safe and free nation for their people. 
Minister Yoon assured continuing close consultations between ROK and U.S. forces 
in this regard. The Minister and the Secretary shared the view that bilateral 
cooperation between the two countries on the Global War on Terrorism would 
strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.  
 
3. The Secretary and the Minister expressed grave concern regarding the North 
Korean nuclear test of October 9, condemned in the strongest terms the North`s clear 
threat to international peace and security as well as the stability of the Korean 
Peninsula, and demanded that North Korea refrain from any further action that might 
aggravate tensions. Both sides welcomed and expressed their support for United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1718. Secretary Rumsfeld offered assurances of 
firm U.S. commitment and immediate support to the ROK, including continuation of 
the extended deterrence offered by the U.S. nuclear umbrella, consistent with the 
Mutual Defense Treaty. Minister Yoon expressed appreciation for the close 
cooperation and steadfast support of the U.S. in the face of North Korean 
intransigence. The Minister and the Secretary observed that their respective Presidents 
had reaffirmed the shared principle of a peaceful and diplomatic resolution of the 
North Korean nuclear issue and had agreed to seek a common and comprehensive 
approach for the resumption and progress of the Six-Party Talks in the ROK-U.S. 
Summit Talks held on September 14 of this year. Both the Secretary and the Minister 
shared the view that North Korea should refrain from provocative actions which could 
worsen the situation. Both sides also urged North Korea to fully implement the Joint 
Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks of September 2005, including 
North Korean abandonment of all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs, its 
early return to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and 
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full implementation of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards 
agreements.  
 
4. The Minister and the Secretary also shared the common understanding that the 
North Korean missile launches of July 2006 were a provocative action that constituted 
a threat to stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as international peace and security. 
Both sides agreed that North Korea's continued development of WMD and long-range 
missiles, along with the danger of the proliferation, were a challenge to the ROK-U.S. 
Alliance. Taking note of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1695, both sides 
demanded that North Korea suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile 
programs and agreed to seek peaceful resolution to this issue.  
 
5. The Secretary and the Minister welcomed the continued development of the ROK- 
U.S. Alliance into a comprehensive, dynamic and mutually beneficial bilateral 
relationship, based on shared values. Both sides concurred that the ROK-U.S. 
Alliance remains vital to the future interests of the two nations and that a solid 
combined defense posture should be maintained in order to secure peace and stability 
on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both sides praised the fact that the 
capabilities of the ROK-U.S. combined forces remain at peak readiness. 
 
6. The Minister and the Secretary agreed that the Alliance, including the U.S. 
presence in Korea, continues to ensure security on the Korean Peninsula and stability 
in Northeast Asia. In this regard, both sides recognized the importance of the United 
Nations Command. Secretary Rumsfeld reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the 
security of the ROK and the Mutual Defense Treaty. Minister Yoon further reaffirmed 
the ROK commitment to mutual defense for the preservation of peace and security.  
 
7. The Minister and the Secretary received reports on the results of the ROK-U.S. 
Security Policy Initiative (SPI) discussions and expressed satisfaction that, through 
close consultations, the ROK and the U.S. are making progress both in pending issues 
concerning realignment of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula and in the joint 
studies on the development of the future ROK-U.S. Alliance. Both sides agreed to 
continue and to enhance SPI consultations in 2007 based on the accomplishments of 
the past two years. 
 
8. The Secretary and the Minister expressed satisfaction with the fact that the ROK 
and the U.S. reached agreement on the Joint Study on the Vision of the ROK-U.S. 
Alliance based on the common understanding of the security environment on the 
Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. Both sides also noted that the Study 
determined that the future Alliance would contribute to peace and security on the 
Korean Peninsula, in the region, and globally. They agreed that the Study presents a 
way forward for the future ROK-U.S. Alliance in response to the changing security 
environment.  
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9. The Minister and the Secretary reviewed the results of the Command Relations 
Study (CRS) including the issue of wartime operational control, which has been 
carried out in accordance with the agreements reached at the 37
th
 SCM. They highly 
praised the fact that the ROK and U.S. have agreed to the CRS roadmap. Both sides 
agreed to expeditiously complete the transition of OPCON to the ROK after October 
15, 2009, but not later than March 15, 2012. The transition will be based on a 
mutually agreed and reasoned plan. The Military Committee will report progress on 
the implementation of this plan annually to the SCM. Both sides agreed to begin 
immediately to develop a detailed joint implementation plan within the first half of 
2007 in accordance with the agreed Roadmap. In noting the target year establishment, 
Secretary Rumsfeld offered assurance that the transition to a new command structure 
will be carried out while maintaining and enhancing deterrence on the Korean 
Peninsula and ROK-U.S. combined defense capabilities. He stated that the U.S. will 
continue to provide significant bridging capabilities until the ROK obtains a fully 
independent defense capability. The Secretary further noted that the U.S. will 
continue to contribute U.S. unique capabilities to the combined defense for the life of 
the Alliance. Both sides pledged the fullest commitment to meeting agreed-to 
benchmarks and timelines regarding the transition. 
 
10. The Secretary and the Minister reviewed the progress of relocation of Yongsan 
Garrison and other United States Forces Korea (USFK) bases. Both sides expressed 
satisfaction that the relocation and return of the bases are proceeding despite some 
challenges, and agreed to exert greater effort to advance the 11. The Minister and the 
Secretary noted with satisfaction that the modernization of the air-to-ground training 
range at Jik-do to ensure conditions for the ROK and the U.S. air forces is on track, 
and Secretary Rumsfeld expressed appreciation for the determined efforts of the 
Korean government in resolving the issue. Minister Yoon acknowledged that ensuring 
sufficient and sustained training conditions for USFK is of critical importance for 
combined readiness. Both sides agreed to make the utmost efforts for the early 
completion of the modernization of Jik-do range so that training conditions for ROK-
U.S. combined military forces are guaranteed.  
 
12. The Secretary and the Minister recognized the successful implementation of 
mission transfers and combined military capability enhancement plans based on the 
close consultation between the two countries. Both sides also acknowledged 
positively the successful agreement on the issue of strategic flexibility of Unites 
States forces based in Korea which was presented in the Joint Statement of Strategic 
Consultation for Allied Partnership held in January 2006. 
 
13. Both sides positively recognized the work of the SCM subcommittees (the 
Security Cooperation Committee (SCC), the Defense Technology and Industrial 
Cooperation Committee (DTICC), and the Logistics Cooperation Committee (LCC)). 
They noted that the DTICC had been given increased stature by raising the level of 
the Co-Chairs to the Under Secretary/Vice Minister level. They also acknowledged 
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that as the Alliance evolves, the SCM subcommittee structure must be examined and 
adjusted to meet current needs, and agreed that the SPI would develop 
recommendations for consideration at the 39
th
 SCM. 
 
14. The Minister and the Secretary concurred that the 38
th
 SCM and the 28
th
 MCM, 
through intense discussions on issues pertinent to the realignment of the Alliance and 
the conclusion of the joint studies on the development of the future ROK-U.S. 
Alliance, strongly supported the continuous development of a future-oriented Alliance. 
Both sides agreed to hold the 39
th
 SCM at a mutually convenient time in 2007 in 
Seoul. 
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